World Science Scholars

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  • Once again, the conclusive answer to these questions must necessarily come back to the defining quality of consciousness: State of awareness from a genuine first-person perspective.

    Does the AI computer (such as Samantha in the movie Her, for example) have her own first-person viewpoint? Unfortunately, there is no way to tell. As Rene Descartes reminded us all with “I think, therefore I am,” the only viewpoint that any of us can possibly vouch for is our own.

    Does Samantha genuinely have her own thoughts and first-person perspective? Or is she simply playing out an incredibly advanced machine-learning algorithm? Sadly, the only way we’d be able to answer with certainty would be to somehow become her and see whether it actually does “feel like anything” to be Samantha.

    Barring this ability to assume her identity, we cannot state one way or the other whether she has her own first-person perspective, regardless of the type of hardware that she has — any more than we can definitively attest to the consciousness of the fellow human beings in our lives who are nearest and dearest to us.

    Then again, I don’t rule out the possibility that I might even be simulated! For kicks, see the YouTube video entitled “Is Reality Real? The Simulation Argument,” among many others.

    As preposterous as it might initially sound, Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument unifies so many radically different models that we have been given for eons, from the days of antiquity straight through modern times — in terms of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, the Holographic Universe, and the countless philosophical, spiritual, literary, and artistic traditions that have asserted that the world that we think we know so well is ultimately an illusion.

    Personally, I believe that the avatar role that I play in this lifetime is an individualized fractal of a much greater whole — a simulated character in a multiverse that expands far and wide beyond this present plane alone.

    Indeed … these are some pretty deep thoughts coming from a replicant … lol.

    Speaking of whether or not dogs have self-consciousness … there’s a really interesting article on NeuroscienceNews.com entitled “Dogs Have A Consciousness Too.”

    Dogs mysteriously failed for years to pass the classic self-recognition test performed with a mirror — until a special “sniff-based” version was developed. It makes perfect sense that the dominant senses of each animal need to be taken into account in designing self-recognition exercises for them; otherwise, it’s like species-biased standardized testing, haha!

    I love the concluding remarks from the article: “The innovative approach to test the self-awareness [of dogs] with a smell test highlights the need to shift the paradigm of the anthropocentric idea of consciousness to a species-specific perspective. We would never expect that a mole or a bat can recognize themselves in a mirror, but now we have strong empirical evidence to suggest that if species other than primates are tested using chemical or auditory perception, we could get really unexpected results.”

    This opens up a vast new realm of exciting possibilities … particularly in light of pan-psychism….

    Yes, I would agree that the subjective integration of sensory data does appear to be one of the most considerable factors that complicates the study of consciousness.

    Let’s consider a hypothetical situation first: If data from each sense organ were merely collected and relayed to a central hub within the brain for assembly and projected display — without any additional modification — neuroscientists would have an easier line of work for two reasons:

    1. Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness would be considerably simpler, if the path for assembly of sensory data were more straightforward. Once the central hub of integration was pinpointed, neuroscientists could simply look for activity in that spot to determine the presence and relative degree of consciousness. Comparisons could more readily be made, and hypotheses could be tested with much greater ease.

    2. If sensory data were merely relayed from the senses to the brain, without any type of modification made by individual processing centers along the way, we would also be in a better position to speculate about how “reality” is perceived by any given individual — and perhaps even other organisms — by examining the info collected by the sensory apparatuses. In that case, two individuals observing the same stimuli should presumably be presented with the same internal display of the information — barring any sort of damage to the areas of the brain involved, of course.

    As things stand, however, the situation appears to be far more complicated — in a complex scenario that has come to be known as “the binding problem.” Information streaming in from each of our senses is essentially dissected and sent out to many different areas of the brain, as a means of processing individual facets of our environment. For example, the secondary visual cortex recognizes contours; the fusiform face area is responsible for facial recognition; the medial temporal area is charged with the detection of motion; and so on. Ultimately, all of these individual data points somehow reassemble to form the multisensory movie-like projection that we each perceive as “reality” — though, as yet, modern science has not determined how or where the construction of this first-person perspective takes place.

    “The dress” viral sensation from 2015 is just one example that clearly demonstrates the noticeable differences in perception that can be detected between people — all within the same species! As we take into account the multitude of details that somehow converge inside our heads to form a picture of reality from our own unique, first-person subjective standpoint, it truly is mind-boggling to contemplate how it all works.

    Yes, I had read about the fascinating case of the 24-year-old Chinese woman mentioned here who showed up at the doctor complaining of dizziness, only to find out that her entire cerebellum was missing! Can you imagine suddenly learning at that age that essentially more than half of your brain is missing?!? (For more details, look up the online article in Science Alert entitled “This Woman Lived 24 Years Without Knowing She Was Missing Her Entire Cerebellum.”) It just goes to show how incredibly resilient and adaptable the brain is! I also loved the discussion here about studies that have shown that bits of information can be processed without any conscious recognition; there’s just so much going on at the subconscious level. Super-interesting!

    Yes, I had read about the fascinating case of the 24-year-old Chinese woman mentioned here who showed up at the doctor complaining of dizziness, only to find out that her entire cerebellum was missing! Can you imagine suddenly learning at that age that essentially more than half of your brain is missing?!? (For more details, look up the online article in Science Alert entitled “This Woman Lived 24 Years Without Knowing She Was Missing Her Entire Cerebellum.”) It just goes to show how incredibly resilient and adaptable the brain is! I also loved the discussion here about the way studies have shown that bits of information can be processed without any conscious recognition; there’s just so much going on at the subconscious level. Super-interesting!

    [CONTINUED FROM THE FIRST POST….]

    Interestingly, the pineal gland could be responsible for regulating our participation in all four of these states — not just wakefulness, dreaming, and dreamless sleep (which makes sense, given its well-documented role in regulating our sleep-wake cycle — converting serotonin into melatonin and vice versa in response to the amount of darkness registered by the retina) — but also in the type of transcendental state implied by “turiya.” Dimethyltryptamine — a powerful hallucinogen commonly abbreviated as “DMT” — has been found in trace amounts in the pineal gland of mice, raising questions about the role that it might play in altered states of consciousness for humans.

    Granted, I recognize that expanding the definition of “consciousness” in this way would potentially make it a heck of a lot more difficult for neuroscientists to study from an objective standpoint — which is, at the end of the day, precisely their job description. “The hard problem of consciousness” has been challenging enough to solve, without throwing an additional wrench into the cogs.

    Still … I wonder whether the present definition of “consciousness” is truly accurate, for the purpose of understanding the full extent of it? Does first-person perception suddenly disappear when we drift off into dreamless sleep every night and randomly reemerge in the morning — or does it merely change forms during the period in between?

    Clearly, none of these are easy questions to address. Yet, at the very least, they’re fascinating food for thought….

    For all practical purposes, consciousness does seem to equate fairly closely to “state of awareness,” in terms of nailing down a simple, straightforward, workable definition. To be more precise, however, we should necessarily incorporate the act of perceiving from a first-person subjective perspective as a critical filter — allowing us to separate what qualifies as consciousness from that which does not.

    Of course, there are various states of consciousness and different levels of arousal, as crucially explained in this module. I also agree with the presented position that — while certain behaviors often accompany consciousness — they do not need to be present in order for something to be defined as “conscious.” It’s quite important to keep the definition of “consciousness” clearly delineated in this way for the purpose of study.

    Intriguingly, I have noticed a difference between the way that “consciousness” has been defined by world-renowned neuroscientists such as Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi versus the way I’ve traditionally thought about it. Giulio Tononi is recognized as the chief developer of Integrated Information Theory — widely considered to be the leading explanation in terms of closing the gap between the subjective experience of consciousness and the objective hardware found within the brain. In an interview with To The Best of Our Knowledge, Giulio gave the following response when asked: “What exactly is consciousness?”

    “[Consciousness] is what goes away when you fall into dreamless sleep or … when you become anesthetized, or when somebody hits you on the head. So we know what goes away then. The world goes away with all its shapes and colors and sounds and fury, if you wish. Ourselves go away; we are not there anymore. Our friends are not there anymore. Nothing is there anymore. And then it comes back, hopefully, when we wake up in the morning or even when we dream.”

    Coming from a spiritual perspective, I’m realizing that I do have a noticeably different conception of “consciousness.” In short, I don’t see this “state of awareness” — distinguished by first-person perception — necessarily being confined to the physical plane? Is it conceivable that — instead of “going away” during the dreamless state or anesthetization, for example, and then miraculously reappearing when we wake up — first-person perception continues unabated during that time, albeit in a different form?

    For example, the Mandukya Upanishad outlines four possible states of consciousness:

    1. Wakefulness (Jagrat)
    2. Dreaming (Svapna)
    3. Deep Dreamless Sleep (Sushupti)
    4. Transcendence / Superconsciousness (Turiya)

    I see my own view aligning with this type of model — with more of a continuum to the transition from one state to another. (From my standpoint, “consciousness” is not restricted to wakefulness and dreaming alone.)

    [CONTINUED IN A SECOND POST….]

    The question that Christof raises at the end of this video about the differences observed in brain hardware between conscious and unconscious action is so interesting, because it’s not nearly as clear-cut as one might reasonably expect. I’m sure he’ll be getting into the “Binding Problem” — how do all of the individual components processed in separate compartments of the brain come together to form what we perceive as a single stream of conscious experience? These questions seem so simple — based upon how effortlessly they appear to be performed from our perspective, to the point where we can easily take them for granted — yet they remain some of the deepest mysteries still to be untangled.

    The question that Christof raises at the end of this video about the differences observed in brain hardware between conscious and unconscious action is so interesting, because it’s not nearly as clear-cut as one might reasonably expect. I’m sure he’ll be getting into the “Binding Problem” in a later section — how do all of the individual components processed in separate compartments of the brain come together to form what we perceive as a single stream of conscious experience? These questions seem so simple — based upon how effortlessly they appear to be performed from our perspective, to the point where we can easily take them for granted — yet they remain some of the deepest mysteries still to be untangled.

    The question that Christof raises at the end of this video about the differences observed in brain hardware between conscious and unconscious action is so interesting, because it’s not nearly as clear-cut as one might reasonably expect. I’m sure he’ll be getting into the “Binding Problem” in a later section as well — how do all of the individual components processed in separate compartments of the brain come together to form what we perceive as a single stream of conscious experience in any given moment? These questions seem so simple — based upon how effortlessly they appear to be performed from our perspective, to the point where we can easily take them for granted — yet they remain some of the deepest mysteries still to be untangled.

    I agree with the way Christof singled out “I think, therefore I am” as a historical cornerstone for this subject, essentially expressing “the rock bottom of what [we] can be certain of” — the most rudimentary starting point upon which the rest of the inquiry into the nature and functioning of consciousness can be built.

    The fact that I can register a thought — from a first-person subjective perspective — implies the existence of some form of consciousness, as a pre-given axiom. The content of the perception is irrelevant; this is the crucial factor that distinguishes “I think, therefore I am” from the mindless processes being carried out in the “Philosophical Zombie Argument,” Leibniz’s “Mill Argument,” or the “Chinese Room Argument.” It is the act of registering the thought — as perceived from a first-person subjective viewpoint — that serves as the basis for the axiom.

    To be clear: I am unable to know whether anyone else who declares “I think, therefore I am” is similarly conscious — because I am unable to experience their first-person subjective viewpoint. All I know is that — when I say it — it is an expression of the state of awareness that I appear to have from my own internal standpoint.

    Beyond this simple observation, there seems to be very little that can be said with anything close to certainty. Questions immediately fan out in all directions:

    > What is the nature of my existence as a “thinker”?
    > Am I generating my own thoughts — or are they simply programmed actions, which I have been designed to perceive as my own creations?
    > Do I exist as an individual entity, or do I subsist as an integrated part of a collective whole? (Or is it possible that both could be true — in the same way that light can alternatively exist in the form of either a particle or a wave?)
    > Would I continue to exist as a “thinker” if I were somehow separated from the physical body that I currently appear to be associated with?
    > Is the nature of reality and my existence as a “thinker” illusory and / or simulated?

    Ultimately, however, none of these riddles need to be solved in order for us to begin to explore consciousness, knowing that some form of it must indeed exist. We can use “I think, therefore I am” as a starting point — attempting to connect the first-person subjective experience with the third-person objective mechanisms, as so many brilliant philosophers, scientists, and thinkers have nobly tried to do for centuries.

    In terms of whether or not any of these questions matter … personally, I believe they’re of the utmost importance. I find it helpful to frame the argument in terms of game play: It’s extremely unlikely that I’ll be able to play a game effectively if I don’t even know the rules, the setup, or the nature of the game board. Heck, I might not even be facing in the right direction to achieve the objective! Such is true for life as well: Once I have a better handle on the rules of engagement and the nature of the construct in which I seem to find myself … now I’m finally ready to play to win.

    At the end of the day, I believe that being brave, aware, and motivated enough to pursue the answers to these types of questions is a vital aspect of self-realization — enabling us to achieve full potential, individually and collectively.

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